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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment converges at the intersection of Constitutional Law and
Climate Law. It seeks to explore six various jurisprudential perspectives
and juridical decision-making models in their application to the modern
threat of climate change. Based in some part on Professor Christopher
* © 2021 Kameron T. Wright. J.D. Candidate 2021, University of San Diego
School of Law. 2013 B.S., United States Naval Academy. The author gratefully appreciates
the contributions of the staff and editors of the San Diego Journal of Climate & Energy
Law, as well as the mentorship and encouragement of Professor Roy L. Brooks, University
of San Diego School of Law.
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Stone’s seminal work Should Trees Have Standing? and Professor Roy
Brooks’ book Structures of Judicial Decision Making from Legal
Formalism to Critical Theory, I attempt to provide insight and new lenses
by which the legal scholar may view the legal debate on climate change.
I first digest, through six judicial perspectives, a rather important climate
law Supreme Court case that first broke the mold of traditional “standing”
doctrine. The underlying values and crucial subtext of the various “Justices”
are spoken into and through their perspectives in a quasi-judicial voice. I
then critique these perspectives to challenge their implications and
consequences. And last, I comment on a recent Ninth Circuit case directly
on point that illustrates the conflict and tension between structural
Constitutional doctrine and judicial desire for a living Document for an
evolving world environment. We begin in 2007.
II. MASSACHUSETTS V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
A. Traditional Perspectives
A group of private organizations petitioned the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)1 to begin regulating the emissions of four greenhouse gases,
including carbon dioxide, under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.2 The
petition was based on respected scientific opinions that a well-documented
rise in global temperatures and attendant climatological and environmental
changes have resulted from a significant increase in the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases.3
The EPA ultimately denied the petition, reasoning that (1) the Clean Air
Act does not authorize it to issue mandatory regulations to address global
climate change, and (2) even if the agency had the authority to set greenhouse
gas emission standards, it would have been “unwise to do so at that time,”
because a causal link between greenhouse gases and the increase in global
surface air temperatures was not “unequivocally established.”4

1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (“The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . .
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor
vehicles . . . which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air
pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”).
3. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505, 510; see 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (defining “air pollutant” to
include “any air pollution agent . . ., including any physical, chemical . . . substance . . . emitted
into . . . the ambient air”).
4. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511–13.
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Petitioners were later joined by Massachusetts and other state and local
governments and sought review in the D.C. Circuit.5 A majority of the D.C.
Circuit panel agreed that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his
discretion in denying the rulemaking petition.6 But the circuit court’s
reasoning was a three-way tie. One judge concluded that the Administrator’s
exercise of discretion was proper without addressing the question of
standing.7 Another found that standing was lacking but concurred on the
merits that the Administrator was within his discretion.8 A third judge
dissented, finding that standing was proper and that the EPA administrator
had failed to operate within his discretion.9 Based on the concurrence, the
court denied review of the petition.10
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on two issues.
First, the Court held that petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s
denial of their rulemaking petition.11 To demonstrate standing, a litigant
must show that it has suffered: (1) a concrete and particularized injury that
is either actual or imminent, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant, and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress that injury.12
The Court further elaborated that Congress can “accord[] a procedural
right to protect [the] concrete interests” of citizens to vitiate standing by
statute.13 The Court distinguished the special position of Massachusetts as
a sovereign, and noted that States have sovereign prerogatives over the
territory allegedly affected.14 Furthermore, the exercise of the police power
5. Id. at 514; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which specifies review of the EPA
Administrator’s discretion is within the purview of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
6. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 514–15.
9. Id. at 515–16; Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,
J., dissenting) (reasoning that the petitioners adequately supported the conclusion that the
EPA’s failure to curb greenhouse gas emissions contributed to the sea level changes that
threatened Massachusetts’ coastal property and that a redress requiring a reduction in
emissions would delay the adverse impacts of global warming), rev’d 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 514.
11. Id. at 517.
12. Id.; See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the actual cases and controversies
requirement); see also Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
13. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, n.7).
14. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (distinguishing from Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
where a private individual brought the claim, explaining it was of “considerable relevance” the
party seeking review was a sovereign State); id. at 518–19 (holding that Massachusetts has an
independent, sovereign interest in the preservation of its territory, supporting federal
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to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions was now lodged in the
Federal Government, and the States must have a means of redress.15
Because Congress has ordered the EPA to protect Massachusetts by
prescribing applicable emissions standards,16 and has given Massachusetts “a
concomitant procedural right” to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as “arbitrary and capricious,”17 the majority held that the petitioners’
submissions have satisfied “the most demanding standards of the adversarial
process.”18 The EPA’s “steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent,’”19
and there is a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will
prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.20
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated, “The harms associated
with climate change are serious and well recognized.”21 “That these changes
are widely shared does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome
of this litigation.”22 “Given [the] EPA’s failure to dispute the existence
of a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming, its refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum,
‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries.”23 “While regulating motor-vehicle
emissions may not by itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that
the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether [the] EPA has a duty to take
steps to slow or reduce it.”24

jurisdiction) (“In that capacity [as a quasi-sovereign] the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air.” (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907))).
15. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (holding “[t]hat Massachusetts does in fact
own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ only reinforces the conclusion that
its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise
of federal judicial power.”).
16. Id. at 519–20; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
17. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
18. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
19. Id. at 521; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
20. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521; see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63–68 (1978) (holding that Congress constitutionally limited
liability of nuclear power plants to protect that private sector during development based
on the remote possibility that the ceiling of liability would be reached in a single accident;
relief remained available to parties, thus the law was not unconstitutional).
21. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
22. Id. at 522; see, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998).
23. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 499, 524; Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 66 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (“[The] EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions
reductions would have no discernable impact on future global warming”).
24. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525; see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15
(1982) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a
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The Court held that the petitioners in this case had standing to challenge
the denial of their rulemaking petition with the EPA.25
Second, the Court held that the EPA has statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gases and the agency should not abdicate its mandate to regulate.
The Court noted the difference between an agency refusing to enforce a
rule versus refusing to make a rule.26 The Court found that the EPA rejected
the rulemaking petition based on impermissible considerations and its actions
were therefore “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with
law,”27 demanding that on remand, the EPA must “ground its reasons for
action or inaction in the statute.”28
In response to the EPA’s desire to postpone policy-making on greenhouse
gases, the majority demanded that the agency take action, one way or the
other: “[The] EPA’s alternative basis for its decision—that even if it has
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do
so at this time—rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text.”29
“The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists for it to
make an endangerment finding, and to that end the EPA has refused to
comply with a clear statutory command.”30 On the question of the EPA’s
favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a
favorable decision will relieve his every injury”).
25. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526.
26. Id. at 527. See infra note 56.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2007).
28. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35. See also id. at 500 (the Court elaborates
“[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’
[the] EPA has statutory authority to regulate emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.
That definition – which includes ‘any air pollution agent . . ., including any physical, chemical, . . .
substance . . . emitted into . . . the ambient air . . .’ [the Clean Air Act] embraces all airborne
compounds of whatever stripe. Moreover, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are
undoubtedly ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s].’”).
29. Id. at 532. See id. at 501 (“While the statute conditions EPA action on its
formation of a ‘judgment,’ that judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.’” (citing § 7601(a)(1)).
30. Id. at 533–34 (explaining that “[u]nder the Act’s clear terms, [the] EPA can
avoid promulgating regulations only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. It has refused to do
so, offering instead a laundry list of reasons not to regulate, including the existence of voluntary
Executive Branch programs providing a response to global warming and impairment of
the President’s ability to negotiate with developing nations to reduce emissions. These
policy judgments have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to
climate change and do not amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a
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failing to fulfill its mandate, the Court held that “[t]he EPA has offered no
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases
cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore . . . not in
accordance with the law.”31
The ruling of the D.C. Circuit was reversed and remanded.
1. Judicial Positivism
The POSITIVIST JUSTICE, dissenting:
The Positivist school of thought concurs whole-heartedly with the
dissent of the Chief Justice.32 Evaluation within our current system of
rules, both statutory and those derived from case law, are of the utmost
importance and the Court should avoid any deviation from traditional
canons of established textualist interpretation. The majority in Massachusetts
deviates sharply from clearly established justiciability doctrine precedent
and blurs the lines in our separation of powers. A positivist would
vehemently dissent.
Global warming is not a problem that “has escaped the attention of
policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government,
who consider the regulatory, legislative, and treaty-based means of addressing
global climate change.”33 Petitioners seek to use the judiciary as the vehicle
for instituting change that they consider to occur too slowly within “the
functions of Congress and the Chief Executive.”34 The proper role of the
Court, which the majority now unabashedly rejects, is to adjudicate justiciable
cases and controversies that have proper constitutional standing.35 Petitioners
failed to assert: (1) a particularized injury (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful conduct that is (3) likely to be addressed by the requested
relief.36
A particularized injury must be actual or imminent (not conjectural),37
real and immediate,38 and certainly impending.39 Based on the evidence

scientific judgment. Nor can [the] EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the
uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it would
therefore be better not to regulate at this time. If the scientific uncertainty is so profound
that it precludes [the] EPA from making a reasoned judgment, it must say so.” Id. at 501.).
31. Id. at 534 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2007)).
32. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
33. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
34. See id.; See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. See NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF
YOU CAN KEEP IT 130–37 (N.Y. Crown Forum, 2019).
35. But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
36. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
37. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
38. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
39. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
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in the record, the alleged injury was not particularized.40 Apart from the
issue of Massachusetts, as a State claiming a particularized injury, the
scientific data provided details nothing remotely conclusive.41 Petitioners
claim that Massachusetts will lose “significant state-owned coastal land[s]”
over the next 100 years.42 Furthermore, the model used in that calculation
hypothesizes a 20 to 70 cm rise in sea levels, with a maximum observed
error of 70 cm.43 How the majority concludes that a calculation with an
inherent error equal to its maximum value satisfies the definition of imminence
“taxes the credulity of the credulous.”44
The same conclusion can be reached for causation and redressability,
which are conventionally addressed together. The fair traceability to the
defendant’s alleged misconduct and validity of proposed relief are
significantly lacking. Can we really surmise that the EPA’s refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions is the predominant cause of Massachusetts’
“injury”? The problem of global warming is far too complex to even suggest
that conclusion.45 Beyond the difficulties associated with explaining
causal links, the challenge demonstrating that the EPA’s regulation would
redress the injury is insurmountable.46 According to the petitioner’s own
declarations, the proposed emissions standard regulations might reduce
global emissions a “fraction of 4 percent.”47 The majority’s conclusion that
these causal links and redressability are sufficient to satisfy the elements
of standing is as speculative as it is meritless.

40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The very
concept of global warming seems inconsistent with this particularization requirement.
Global warming is a phenomenon ‘harmful to humanity at large,’ the redress petitioners
seek is focused no more on them than on the public generally–it is literally to change
the atmosphere around the world.” (quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A. 415 F.3d 50, 60
(C.A.D.C. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment))).
41. Id. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] State asserting quasi-sovereign
interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III. . . . [O]ur cases
cast significant doubt on a State’s standing to assert quasi-sovereign interest—as opposed
to direct injury—against the Federal Government.” (rejecting the doctrine of parens patriae
as a substitute for concrete injury and the majority’s reliance on Tennessee Copper Co.)).
See cases cited supra notes 14, 15.
42. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 542–43. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–16, 30–38, Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
47. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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To its credit, the Court’s “special solitude” for Massachusetts limits the
extent to which this new standard of relaxed standing can be expanded in
the future.48 Nonetheless, a positivist cannot abide by the Court’s flagrant
disregard of precedent and the limited role that the judiciary has in our
democratic society. The Court is now untethered from the text of the
Constitution and abandons the doctrine of stare decisis.49 Finding no
basis for standing, the positivist need not comment on the Court’s policydictation to the EPA, but the Pragmatist does so eloquently in the dissenting
part of the following opinion.
Today, the Court functions as a bench of politicians, not as judges. The
positivist dissents.
2. Judicial Pragmatism
The PRAGMATIST JUSTICE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Pragmatism compels writing separately from the majority and the
Positivist because although agreeing with the Court’s finding on standing,
the Pragmatist cannot abide by the forced policymaking on the EPA. On
that inquiry, Pragmatism agrees with Positivism, finding the majority
violates the separation of powers doctrine.
First, a Pragmatist would hold that petitioners have standing to challenge
the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition. This case “suffers from
none of the defects” that would preclude it from being a justiciable Article
48. Id. at 548. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (establishing that “[the Federal Government]
shall, and a State may, take such measures, including . . . seeking injunctive relief, as
necessary to [enforce the Clean Air Act]”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (establishing that private plaintiffs have standing
to seek injunctive relief and civil damages for Clean Water Act violations); Citizens for
Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2003) (establishing
standing for citizens to allege procedural violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act’s notice and comment requirements and the Endangered Species Act’s consultation
and biological-assessment requirements); but see Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d
1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., concurring) (in denying rehearing en banc, rejected
the dissenting view that “[holding] that non-state entities categorically lack standing to use
the Clean Air Act to compel state action on global warming—disregards Supreme Court
precedent, makes bad law for our circuit, and harms the public”; refusing to expand the
reasoning of Massachusetts to allow for suits by private, non-state entities; and holding
“[Massachusetts] does nothing to restrict environmental litigation beyond those limitations
already established by the Supreme Court. And the opinion leaves open the many doors
that previously existed under our case law for governmental entities and private parties to
litigate with respect to injuries resulting from global climate change.”); infra notes 136–51
and accompanying texts.
49. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; see, e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990). See also GORSUCH,
supra note 34, at 121–25.
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III “controvers[y].”50 To demonstrate standing, a litigant must show that
it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury, that is either actual or
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that a
favorable decision will likely redress that injury.51
The Pragmatist would agree that where Congress has “accord[ed] a
procedural right to protect [the] concrete interests” of citizens and Massachusetts
has sovereign prerogatives over the territory affected, the exercise of
police power to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, now lodged
in the Federal Government, provides a means of redress.52 It is clear that
Congress intended to provide a cause of action rooted in environmental
protection policy, and a Pragmatist justice would no more than vindicate
this normative value.
Therefore, the Pragmatist would also agree that Massachusetts has a
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as
arbitrary and capricious, that the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both actual and
imminent, (to the extent necessary to vitiate standing) that refusal to
regulate such emissions contributes to Massachusetts’ injuries, and that
there is a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will
prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.53 This is merely policydiscovery; it is well established as an unarticulated norm that we should
endeavor to protect the environment and sometimes that means that new
rules and regulations must be made. When they are not made, clear public
policy dictates that a procedure be available to redress the failure of an
agency to perform as required by law.54
50. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 498; see, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
51. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
52. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (concluding that Massachusetts has an independent,
sovereign interest in the preservation of its territory, supporting federal jurisdiction); id.
(“Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’ only
reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete
to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.”); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
53. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (citing Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 79); Id. at
519–21; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Massachusetts,
415 F.3d at 65 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“[The] EPA would presumably not bother with such
efforts if it thought emissions reductions would have no discernable impact on future
global warming.”).
54. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (“[A]ny person may
commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency. . . [or] to compel the Secretary to
apply . . . the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to . . . this Act with respect
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This conclusion is based on reasoned elaboration from existing arrangements,
and only goes so far as policy-discovery, merely expanding the doctrine
of standing to an evolving modern problem. This allows for vindication
of the articulated (or arguably unarticulated) norm that climate change
efforts need to be addressed and challenged in the courts where the
Executive fails to follow Congress’s command.55 The Pragmatist would
therefore concur in the judgment on this first question on standing.
Where Pragmatism departs from the majority, however, is on the
difference between an agency not enforcing a rule versus refusing to make
a rule.56 That is not for the Court to decide as a matter of policy; Congress
sets the limit of Administrative discretion and the President oversees its
execution. Today, the Court engages in policy-making not delegated to
nor constitutionally within its purview; Courts generally do not tell agencies
how to obey statutes. A Pragmatist would therefore write separately to dissent
on the merits.
First, the Court in Massachusetts deviates from its own mandate as a
neutral arbiter of Congressional and Executive policy. Under the President’s
direction, the EPA is entrusted by Congress with creating and enforcing
rules and regulations related to the reduction of air pollutants that endanger
public health or welfare.57 The statute is void of permissible (or impermissible)
reasons for which the EPA may defer judgment on a rulemaking petition.58
There is no legitimacy behind the Court’s policy-making directives issued
by the majority. The EPA gave reasons enough for not wanting to decide
on Massachusetts’ petition.59
to taking of any resident endangered species or threatened species . . . [or] against the
Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
55. See infra note 88; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120) (petitioners conceding that the Court need not decide
the merits of climate change in order to find standing).
56. Compare Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (“There are key difference between a
denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement
action. . . . Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though
such a review is extremely limited and highly deferential.”) (internal quotations omitted);
with id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where does the [Clean Air Act] say that the EPA
Administrator is required to come to a decision on this question whenever a rulemaking
petition is filed? The Court points to no such provision because none exists.”) (emphasis
added).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7521; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–46, Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
58. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he statute says nothing
at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment—the
permissible reasons for deciding not to grapple with the issue at the present time.”).
59. Id. (“The reasons EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly
take into account . . . when deciding whether to consider entering a new field: the impact
such entry would have on the Executive Branch programs and on foreign policy.”); id. at
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Some, though not all, Pragmatists cannot agree with the conclusion that
the EPA rejected the rulemaking petition based on impermissible
considerations.60 The Administration provided justification for its inaction,
namely that it could not with any certainty postulate that the proposed
regulations would have the desired effect of curbing climate change.61
Pragmatist jurists in particular favor yielding to the experts and trust the
EPA in their determinations within their purview. If Congress wants to
“force an agency’s hand,” it knows how to do so.62
Second, the Court’s reliance on the Clean Air Act is misguided. The
policy considerations behind the Clean Air Act had nothing to do with
climate change and everything to do with breathable air and the reduction
of fluorocarbons and other airborne toxins.63 Nothing in the history of the
Clean Air Act pontificates on the need to curb the presumptuous causes
of global warming.64
The role of the EPA is to issue regulations as it sees fit in accordance
with the directives from Congress. It is not the role of the Court to legislate
based on policy considerations on matters delegated by the Legislature to
the Executive.65 Although the Pragmatist is no stranger to validation of
policies, articulated or not, some would still firmly believe that today’s ruling
goes too far. “Legislatures create policy, courts create law.”66 Whether a

531–32 (“EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor
vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job that
Congress has assigned to [the Department of Transportation].”); id. at 533 (“EPA said . . .
that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key
developing nations’ to reduce emissions.”) (citing Control of Emissions From New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68. Fed. Reg. 52, 931–32 (Sept. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 86)).
60. See id. at 534–35, 550–52.
61. Id. at 553–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Control of Emissions From New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68. Fed. Reg. 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 86)).
62. Id. at 550; see, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986).
63. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 556–59; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at
42–48, 51–52, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(f)(3); see also 42 U.S.C. supra note 2, §§ 7521, 7571, 7582,
7602, 7619.
65. Massachusetts, 549 U.S at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is a straightforward
administrative-law case, in which Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad
discretion, not to us, but to an executive agency”).
66. ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 140 n.35 (2nd ed. 2005) (citing Neil Duxbury, Faith in
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proposed rule is within the EPA’s purview limited by Congress may be
justiciable as a matter of statutory interpretation. However, whether the
EPA should be forced to adjudicate proposed rules before they are ripe is
a question of policymaking and deference should therefore be given to the
agency.67 “Th[e] Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome
for the reasoned judgment of a responsible agency.”68 The Executive’s
role is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”69 As Justice Scalia
noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, “[The Court should] not enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress, to ‘assume a position of authority
over the governmental acts of another co-equal [branch of government].’
And [] become ‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness
of Executive action.’”70 The separation of powers doctrine forbids what
the majority commands.
Pragmatists believe that a fair process is granted by our answer to
the standing question, thus concurring in that judgment alone because we
have evolved the law and given recourse through a procedural remedy that
was previously foreclosed. But pragmatism generally counsels against the
Court’s indifference to the policy determinations of an executive agency.
Duly delegated the authority to adjudicate policy questions, the Executive
is now second-guessed by the Court for want of a particularly desired
result.
Pragmatists would dissent as to that conclusion.

Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO LAW REV. 601,
661 (1993).
67. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (“When a
court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. . . . If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.”) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
68. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
70. Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (first quoting Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); then quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984));
see also GORSUCH, supra note 34, at 61–69.
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3. Judicial Nominalism
The NOMINALIST JUSTICE, concurring:
Looking only towards what he/she “feels” is the right result, the
Nominalist looks only to one’s internal understanding of right and wrong.
When action is imperative, legalistic doctrines should not stand in the way
of judicial will. The Legislature provided a means to an end and the Executive
wishes to abdicate its duty and authority to see it through. The judiciary
need not address the rule or precedent established here; the only matter of
any import is that the Court do right by the parties involved in the present
case, which makes the task before the bench an easy one. Although
capable of going either way, let us assume the Nominalist would concur
completely with the majority and side with the environment, as legal realists
typically have done.
Nominalists are cynical and skeptical of all the rules and established law
cited by more traditionalist jurists.71 Positivism and Pragmatism prefer
the lethargic crutches of outmoded legal doctrines instead of the speed of
their own legs. American constitutional jurisprudence on the requirements
of standing is as outdated as it is inflexible. The Nominalist sees no reason
to continue to apply some antiquated principle like standing when the
right answer is clear. The majority believes the scientific data presented
and the Nominalist is free to adopt or reject those factual assertions. But
why Justice Stevens bothers to cloak his true colors in some half-baked
attempt to rationalize his reasoning about a State’s prerogatives and privileges
is beyond the Nominalist’s comprehension; the Nominalist wishes that
Justice Stevens would simply concede that all jurists, including himself,
reason first with their emotion every time. Every judge is a nominalist at
heart. The country needs to cut greenhouse gas emissions and if that means
abandoning some ancient doctrine, “so be it.”
The Nominalist would rule that Massachusetts or any other litigant
joining the petition has legal standing to challenge the EPA. If the Court
fails to find standing in this case, it will have to find it in another case,
unless it desires to abdicate its power to the same extent the EPA has
attempted to do here. The EPA had a job to do, and the Court should do
it for them as it sees fit. Furthermore, a Nominalist may forewarn the EPA
71. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 102, 175 (commenting on legal realists’ fact-skepticism
and rule-skepticism and tendency to favor consequentialist approaches in judicial decisionmaking. The nominalist judges purely from the “gut” and seeks to find the “best result”
only for the case sub judice).
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that any failure to regulate in the future will warrant further judicial review
and if the Court must micromanage the nuances of that agency to ensure
the best result in each case then that is what the Court should be prepared
to do.
As observed above, Judicial Nominalists have the philosophical temperaments
of legal realists. Nominalists reject the need for consistency in the law
and arguably the “rule of law” in the conventional sense ceases to exist.
Although doubtful of most universal facts and truths,72 the facts presented
here (and the summary detailed by the Asymmetrical theorist below)
make the case for protecting the climate clear. There is the possibility the
facts about climate change are wrong and the Nominalist’s concerns are
entirely meritless. But it is surely better for judges to act when no action
is needed than risk the consequences of a failure to act when the call of
duty is imperative. Even if judicial action proved to be ineffectual, the result
is immaterial because justice demands the Court not sit idle when confronted
with an opportunity for progress.
The very prospect that a failure to judicially act on climate change could
doom our species compels the Nominalist to concur.
B. Critical Theorist Perspectives
In contrast to the three main traditional perspectives of judicial decision
making, the critical theories require changing the datum and viewpoint of
legal analysis. The crux of critical theory is critically assessing the existing
rule through the lens of the “outsider.” In short, the critical theorist will
first deconstruct the existing rule or arrangement, and then reconstruct a
remedy, based on the perspective of the “outsider.” In the case discussed
here, the environment, or some entity thereof, is the representative
outsider. Each theorist will define the insider and outsider differently, and
in so doing, effect the reconstruction of their perspective. The remedy
must then pass through four epistemology tests to evaluate its validity and
sufficiency in answering the outsider’s source of subordination.73

72. See id. at 174–83 (“[L]egal realism displays the predominant intellectual temperament
of judicial nominalism . . . . [however] [j]udicial nominalism’s normativity—its commitment
to the best results in particular cases—is problematic.”). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally be the
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”).
73. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 243–55 (discussing the criticalist “way of knowing,”
the truths and “hypertruths” each seeks to validate, and defining the rational/empirical,
standpoint, postmodern, and positionality epistemologies).
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1. Judicial Symmetry
The SYMMETRICAL JUSTICE, concurring
The Symmetrical theorist would start with the existing rule: the issue
here is about standing, whether a party possess the legal prerequisites that
allow its claims to be recognized and adjudicated by our courts. Standing
is what makes a suit a “case or controversy.”74 Standing is vital; it is the
foundation upon which a party asserts its desire for relief. 75 Without
standing, there is no recourse in the courts of law and equity. In the
Symmetrical theorist’s view, we must level this procedural playing field
with a neutrally-minded rule. Symmetricalists first determine if an existing
arrangement (rule or law) is insider or outsider conscious. In this regard,
if a law is not neutral, then the disfavored party is subordinated by the law.
Symmetricalists will then seek to remedy subordination with a facially
neutral law.76
An important assumption necessary for critical analysis, first requires
acceptance that Mother Earth is an outsider subordinated by the law and
by human history. Our entire legal system and notions of property law
have deprived the entity that bore our existence from what is rightfully
hers and has served our human race’s advancement at her subordination.
Her silence can no longer be condoned as assent to her own destruction.
She must be given an equal voice. But, the Judiciary should not force an
Executive agency to act nor can judges micromanage interpretation of various

74. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced,
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.
Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead
to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.”).
But see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750–52 (1984).
75. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, 35 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010) (2002) (“Standing, broadly
understood, is the authority of someone to initiate an action.”).
76. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 261–62 (“Applying the symmetrical equality model,
the judge finds subordination if the matter under consideration is insider- or outsiderconsciousness . . . . Having found subordination, the judge then prescribes a facially
neutral law to redress the identified subordination.”) (footnote omitted); see also Roy L.
Brooks, “Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process,” 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 475, 481–83 (2003).
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statutes, congressional directives, and agency regulations.77 And, it will
not always be the case where a State as noble as Massachusetts has the
fortitude to effectuate litigation that gives the judicial branch the footing
it requires to issue a remedy. Our current concept of standing is antiquated
and archaic in scope. The narrow framework of standing must be reconstructed
to accommodate that which cannot pursue protection through litigation on
its own behalf. The Court must, therefore, expand the foundation of our
idea of who, or what, has standing to bring a claim.78
Consequently, the Symmetrical justice would differ from his colleagues
in the majority on the preliminary question of standing in that a symmetrical
theorist would be convinced that the injury in fact applies equally to any
human on Earth as it applies to Massachusetts. Courts should not limit the
standing of private individuals, nor the environment itself in seeking
redress from the judiciary. It may seem preposterous to grant inanimate
objects the legal right to sue, but yet we give credence to the legal fiction
of corporations.79 Courts allow every sect of minority person to have an
identifiable perspective.80 Courts allow for the advocacy of children with
or without their consent. F urthermore, courts appoint guardians for
representation where they are due.
The Symmetrical theorist would hold that the government and petitioners
jointly appoint a guardian to be approved by this Court to represent Mother
Earth, who may file claims and seek injunctive, declaratory, or monetary
relief on her behalf, but who is simultaneously immune from suit as a
matter of law.81
Similarly, the government is represented offensively by the Department
of Justice under the guidance of the Attorney General, and defensively by
the Solicitor General. Courts have long held that criminal defendants be

77. See supra notes 50–70 and accompanying text.
78. STONE, supra note 75, at 10–11, 49–70 (discussing the development of the “many
fronts of standing” in environmental law).
79. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the rights
of corporations in America); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,
636 (1819) (the Marshall Court issuing a landmark decision solidifying the rights of
private corporations in America over a century earlier); see also United States v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809); JOEL RICHARD PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL AND HIS TIMES 373–80 (New York: Riverhead Books) (2018).
80. See Francisco Valdes, Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1265, 1278–93 (1999).
81. STONE, supra note 75, at 8–10 (discussing how “friends” of the environment can
fulfill a plethora of duties that guardians generally perform, let alone provide legal representation);
see also STONE, supra, text accompanying note 49 (noting how a single appointed guardian
remedy would avoid the difficulty and complications of multiple jurisdictions granting
guardians for a single entity).
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appointed counsel and we provide the same through a compulsory process.82
Minors and those adjudicated legally incompetent are appointed guardians
to make decisions they are legally incapable of making.83 Corporations
have general counsel.84 Even the deceased and their eternal estates are
represented by executors.85 It is no stretch of the legal imagination to grant
legal standing to Earth via an appointed legal guardian, who may seek redress
of wrongs on her behalf.86
This holding would grant no more legal rights to the environment than
those already endowed upon humans. It merely levels the playing field
and is insider-outsider neutral in that regard. Finding that remedy satisfactory,
the Symmetrical theorist would need not address the inner workings of
the EPA’s decision-making since this solution of equal standing is enough
to create an equal process.
This rule survives empirical and rational epistemology—the logical truth.
Logically, if a defect in the law caused a lack of standing to challenge a
failure to regulate, then granting that standing is an appropriate remedy.
The environment, and future generations of humanity,87 collectively, would
have a voice in a court of law where one did not exist before. This neatly
circumvents the Positivist’s concerns over particularized injury, as it appoints
a single guardian to protect the interests of a collective injury, while minimizing
the potential for vexatious litigation.
This rule passes muster under standpoint epistemology—the truth of the
outsider. The representative outsider, in this case the climate at large and
her inheritors, the future generations of unborn humans, the Amazon rainforest,
and the birds of the air and the beasts of the field are all given a legal right
that they did not have before. If trees, the representative outsiders, could
speak, they would desire the legal standing to challenge EPA regulations
that fail to curb greenhouse gas emissions and slow global warming. In

82. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967).
83. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
84. See generally Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also
CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 64–66 (Green Books
2d ed. 2011) (2002) (criticizing the legally fictitious creature called a corporation for having
“too many rights” and “few responsibilities”).
85. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1
(AM. LAW INST. 1986).
86. STONE, supra note 75, at 62–68 (first proposing the idea of guardianship for the
environment).
87. See STONE, supra note 75, at 103–14 (discussing standing for future generations).
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particular, the representative outsiders benefit from this holding in that their
interests in the EPA’s regulations under the Clean Air Act are now voiced.
This last point demonstrates the limitations of a symmetrical holding
under postmodern epistemology, of which it fails to satisfy. Postmodern
epistemology validates the truth of every intersectionality of outsider. The
unrepresentative outsider is of course every fish of the sea and every lake
and river that does not or cannot benefit from a new greenhouse gas
regulation issued by the EPA under the Clean Air Act. The Symmeticalist’s
remedy of guardianship-standing does nothing to better the plight of those
species or sectors of the environment that suffer at the hands of toxic waste
contamination, poisoned ground-waters, or landfills. Even at its maximum
employment, this new rule is too narrow in its grant of a neutral procedural
remedy that it fails to vindicate the interests of those ecosystems that would
not benefit from a Clean Air Act regulation. These injuries may be addressed
in future litigation. For now, the Symmetrical justice might justify his
holding by focusing on the parties directly affected by climate change and
the injuries within the power of the EPA under the statute at issue here to
amend.88 The Symmetrical theorist would accept the compromise of leaving
other environmental injuries by a failure to regulate under some other statute
for some other day.
Under positionality epistemology, the analysis goes beyond the mere
truths of other epistemologies and considers only what are “permanent truths”
or “hypertruths.” The greatest hypertruth furthered by the Symmetricalist
would recognize that we are all part of the human race and this great
organism that is our planet. We must actively protect the planet if we are
to survive. Providing an advocate for a Living Being silenced for thousands of
years guarantees a new, fair process of living in symbiosis with our Mother
Earth. Of course, this hypertruth stands in stark contrast to the values of
industry, capitalism, and society’s economic progress. But, balancing the
two competing hyper truths in light of the existential question compels the
only conclusion: our planet must win.
Accordingly, the Symmetrical justice would concur in the judgment.
2. Judicial Asymmetry
The ASYMMETRICAL JUSTICE, concurring

88. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (No. 05-1120) (conceding to Justice Kennedy that the Court need not decide the
merits of climate change in order to find standing); see also id. at 4 (“We are not asking
the Court to pass judgment on the science of climate change or to order EPA to set
emission standards. We simply want EPA to visit the rulemaking petition based upon
permissible considerations.”) (Petitioner’s counsel opening statement).
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Rather than seeking an insider-outsider neutral solution, the Asymmetrical
theorist wants to counterbalance the scales: as the majority notes, “the
unusual importance of the underlying issue persuaded us to grant the
writ.”89 “If carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study groups finds no
reason to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe
that these changes will be negligible…. A wait-and-see policy may mean
waiting until it is too late.”90 We simply cannot wait. An Asymmetrical
theorist must concur only in the judgment, but for reasoning much more
critical of the existing law than her colleagues.
The Asymmetrical theorist would agree with the Symmetrical theorist
that the court should address the existing structure of the law but would
see the severity of the subordination issue with greater clarity.
Asymmetricalists will find an existing arrangement subordinates outsiders
if it adversely affects outsiders by either unconscious bias or insider
privilege.91 “Insiderism” need not be intended by a law or rule; it can merely
be an effect of unconscious bias.92 To the Asymmetricalist then, the relevant
outsider norms are the appropriate lens through which to perceive the
subordination question.93 In the presence of outsider subordination, the
Asymmetricalist will fashion a remedy that grants preference to the
outsiders to counter-balance the historical subordination.94 Affirmative
action is an example of Asymmetricalist doctrine. The denial of the
environment—Mother Earth—equal standing in a court of law exudes
insiderism and cannot be corrected by merely granting equal rights. A
non-sentient being, such as our planet, can never be considered an equal
in the man-made creation that is the practice of law.95 No court could ever
give Mother Earth the equality she deserves. After all, “there is no greater
inequality than the equal treatment of unequals.”96
89. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 506.
90. Id. at 508 n.11. But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 88.
91. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 239 (“Subordination, or anti-objectivism, is established . . .
if a law or institutional practice negatively impacts outsiders and, . . . enhances or maintains
insider privilege.”); see also id. at 262.
92. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 240.
93. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 262; see also id. at 246 (“those who have experienced
discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen”).
94. BROOKS, supra note 66, at 261–64; see RUTH BADER GINSBURG ET AL., MY OWN
WORDS 245 (2016) (“I do not suggest that the Court should never step ahead of the political
branches in pursuit of a constitutional precept.”).
95. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 21, 55–61 (noting the dangers of humanity’s
self-delusion that the “idea of law” justifies ignorance of Earth’s law).
96. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 184 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

109

WRIGHT_12 (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2021 9:40 AM

But the issue here is not just one of standing, because giving trees the
right to sue does nothing if men do not take up the law in the environment’s
defense. Trees should not have to rely on the continued subordination or
selective representation that would come from being granted a legal right.
That which hath born us is not subservient to rights humans grant; the
creation does not give the creator rights. Earth has had natural rights since
before the dawn of the human race. We have just failed to recognize them
in our indomitable exercise of self-serving dominion.
“The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized.”97
There has long been tension between environmentalists looking to mitigate
the consequences of economic development and the more aggressive
proponents of government-initiated climate change adaptation policy.98
The effect of greenhouse gas emissions on global temperature rise and the
disparate effects on sea levels are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of
the devastating environmental impacts due to anthropological causes.99
Based on the cause and effect relationship between emissions regulations
(or lack thereof) and injury to the climate as a whole,100 the Asymmetrical
theorist would find the Court uniquely positioned to greatly influence the
course of environmental propensities in our society. An Asymmetricalist
would not shy away from the opportunity to correct (even overcorrect) the
subordination.
Asymmetrical theorists would like to concur with Symmetrical’s proposed
holding, but he does not go far enough. Guardians can be bought; they can
be slovenly and lethargic and ineffective. First, an Asymmetricalist would
hold that any public or private entity has standing to petition the EPA. As
the positivist notes in his dissent, the majority’s reliance on Massachusetts’
sovereignty is foolish at best.101 The private organizations that make up

97. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521; J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T. L. REV. 363, 379–81 (2010)
(explaining that climate change symptoms are well captured and consequences forecast).
98. Ruhl, supra note 97, at 366–76, 378 (forecasting ten structural trends that are
expected in environmental law as the field reacts to adaptation modes and policy
pressures).
99. Ruhl, supra note 97, at 379 nn.38–39 (citing numerous sources and volumes of
research to show conclusively, among other determinations, that “air pollution control will
accelerate warming in the coming decades,” and a positive feedback loop of lost plant life
and melting tundra further increases production of net greenhouse gases).
100. James E. Parker-Flynn, The Intersection of Mitigation and Adaptation in Climate
Law and Policy, 38 ENVIRONS ENV’T. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 2 (2014); see also id. at nn.1–12.
101. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19. But see id. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on the state’s established authority over
resources within its borders as an impetus to expand its alleged susceptibility to injury,
including a rising sea level that impedes the use of its own land).
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the vast bulk of the petitioners here are equally injured and seek an equal
remedy and should therefore have equal standing.
Second, the Asymmetrical justice would not limit these suits to the
Clean Air Act. She would grant standing for any claim for any failure to
regulate under existing or future statutes related to environmental protection,
not just for the statute addressed in this case. The urgency of this existential
problem demands this kind of action, and again, we have the opportunity
to reach all intersectionalites of the environment, and thus all outsiders to
this existing arrangement.
Thirdly, she would hold, as a matter of law, that the EPA is directed and
obligated to use its authority to regulate emissions and slow the pace of
climate change, in all suits and petitions against it, excepting only a narrowly
tailored compelling state interest to do otherwise.102 The EPA would no
longer have discretion over instituting new regulations; it would be mandated
to do so. In any instance when a petition desires a new greenhouse gas cutting
ordinance, the EPA will approve it. The only redress for an affected entity
is to seek review in the D.C. Circuit per the Clean Air Act and ultimately
by appeal to the Court. A compelling interest is of the most exacting
constitutional standard.103 Here, the Asymmetrical justice demands that a
refusal to regulate must satisfy strict scrutiny. Henceforth, an Asymmetrical
justice would dictate the default rule is that new climate saving regulations
will be granted when they are requested. Combined with the newly granted
standing addressed above,104 this holding would bring about drastic and
much needed social change and will end the subordination of the
environment.
To be clear: she does not believe this mandate comes from any
congressional statute nor is justified through legislative history. Of course, the
Clean Air Act may have started movement in the right direction, but for
the wrong reasons. Those statutes, in the end, were self-serving to the human
race, whereas the Asymmetricalist’s ruling is based on redressing Earth’s
injury from humans since the Industrial Revolution. The Asymmetrical

102. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973) (finding
a compelling interest and a law narrowly tailored to that end is a judicial standard of strict
scrutiny); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
103. Corso v. Fischer, 983 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (“Strict
scrutiny is usually the ‘death knell’ for the challenged regulation”) (citing Falwell v.
Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (W.D. Va. 2002); Mood for a Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake City,
953 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 n.12 (D. Utah 1995)).
104. See supra notes 74–88 and accompanying text.
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theorist purely relies on the norms expected by the environment if it could
speak for itself, and she merely grants the responsibility for addressing
those concerns to the agency in our government most apt to fulfill them.
“The lawn tells me it wants water by certain dryness of the blades of
soil. . . . We make decisions on behalf of, and in the purported interest of,
other every day; these ‘others’ are often creatures whose wants are far less
verifiable, and even far more metaphysical in conception, than the wants
of rivers, trees, and land.”105 The Asymmetricalist would agree that the
Earth is communicating the symptoms of its injury to us by its reactions
to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide, the induced effects of climate
change and global warming. Make no mistake, this is an action of corrective
policy and is in effect environmental affirmative action. The situation
calls for a transformation of the lens through which we view the law.106
The Court must create a shield for Mother Earth out of the sword that has
been used to enslave her lands, waters, and resources for centuries.107
The context of this ruling necessitates that she defines the affected
groups. The symmetrical justice properly described the subordinated
outsiders as Mother Earth and all her children who suffer from a failure to
regulate greenhouse gases. The insiders, therefore, are the establishment
and the government, which in themselves are merely representatives of
the interests of corporations, the industrialists, the titans of business and
our capitalist society at large.108 Their interests are ones of economy, in
plain contrast to the environment’s interest of survival. The rule the
Asymmetrical justice crafts today will vindicate the norms of the outsiderenvironment; to what expense on behalf of the insider-establishment is of
no consequence to the Asymmetrical theorist.

105. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); STONE,
supra note 75, at 11 (Professor Stone asserting that natural objects in the environment can
in fact speak for themselves).
106. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (understanding the symptoms of
injury provides judges the norms through which to perceive the subordination).
107. Thomas Berry, Forward to CULLINAN , supra note 84, at 19 (“This legal
foundation . . . exalted the property-owning citizen beyond anything known previously in
the history of political establishments. The difficulty is not exactly with the rights granted
to humans; the difficulty is that no rights and no protections were granted to any nonhuman mode of being.”).
108. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 26–31; see also BERRY, Forward to CULLINAN,
supra note 84, at 19 (“From its beginning the American Constitution was clearly a
document framed for the advancement of the human with no significant reference to any
other power in heaven or Earth. In the Bill of Rights, added as the first ten amendments, a
detailed listing of the rights of individual persons was given. Humans had finally become
self-validating, both as individuals and as a political community. This self-validation was
invented and sustained by the union of the commercial-entrepreneurial powers with the
legal-judicial powers to sustain the assault on the natural world.”).
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This holding is entirely rational from the climate’s perspective. If given
the ability to craft its own remedy for its injury, the environment would
certainly agree with an Asymmetricalist.109 Where at least one sentient
human, one of Earth’s own, has the conscience to litigate on her behalf, a
petition may at least be heard and by default a rule granted unless a
compelling interest justifies otherwise. The standard of strict scrutiny
serves to affirm the interests of the petitioners in the absence of a truly
extraordinary (compelling) government interest.110
The representative climate would readily accept this remedy and
therefore this holding passes standpoint and postmodern epistemologies.
Mother Earth would welcome an EPA more attuned to meeting her needs
on a consistent basis at the expense of the insiders who devised a system
effectuating her continued subordination. This holding also neatly corrects
the limitations of the Symmetrical justice’s holding and applies to all
intersectionalities of the environment, because I have broadened the scope
of applicable statutes. Some may think that by satisfying the norms of the
non-representative member of the environment, the standpoint epistemology
is no longer satisfied. An Asymmetrical theorist would remain unpersuaded
that conflict requires her attention; given this set of circumstances and the
breadth of this holding, Asymmetrical theorists care more about saving
the fish as well as the birds than to debate whether the latter would consider
the former to have equal injury.
Like the symmetrical holding, under positionality this holding acknowledges
and furthers the hypertruth of good stewardship of our planet. Despite the
relativity of truths between and amongst our race, the ultimate truth is
undeniable: without a home, the rest of our endeavors are forfeit to our

109. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting); See STONE, supra note
75, at 11.
110. STONE, supra note 75, at 17–22 (suggesting an effort should be made to afford
non-human life representative and procedural rights and notes that Congress has done so
in legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act. He also notes, however, that
this and similar statutory measures generally limit the federal government’s footprint but
does nothing to alter the conduct of private corporations.).
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ignorance. We must have an environment in which a civilization is capable
of existing.111 “A wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.”112
The majority could have and should have done more. The Asymmetrical jurist
can only concur in the judgment of the majority, but not the majority’s
reasoning.
3. Judicial Hybridism
The HYBRIDIST JUSTICE, concurring
The Hybrid critical theorist would agree with both Symmetrical and
Asymmetrical colleagues to some extent.113 While the Symmetrical holding
refused to address the decision-making of the EPA and resolved only the
question of standing, the Asymmetrical ruling would instigate incalculable
amounts of litigation114 and creates too exacting a standard for the EPA to
exercise its discretion. Where one party, say polar bears, loses a suit, and
another party, sea lions, attempts to sue on the same facts and law, endless
and vexatious litigation can occur. Courts will likely operate under “compulsory
joinder” rules in order to eliminate these complications. Hybridists do not
see a need to be as drastic as Asymmetricalists in their reconstructions.
They seek only to neutralize insider power, not vanquish it.
Hybridists would concur with the Symmetrical holding on guardianship
and would add a requirement that the EPA provide a decision on a petition,
justifying all rejections with a substantial government interest within 180
days of its filing. Hybridists would also agree with the second Asymmetrical
holding, regarding the broadening of the case at hand to include all
environmental regulations, not just those under the Clean Air Act. The
proposed test of strict scrutiny, however, requiring a compelling interest
is rarely if ever, satisfied,115 whereas the Hybridist compromise of a proposed
111. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 157–66; see also id. at 138–45 (arguing for
“transformation in law and governance” and articulates a new philosophy of law call
“Earth jurisprudence.” This includes rethinking the most basic of concepts such as property
law.); see also id. at 7–10 (focusing on an “earth-centric perspective of law and regulation.”).
112. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 508, note 11 (citing Climate Research Board, Carbon
Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment vii, viii (1979)).
113. See BROOKS, supra note 66, at 264, 265 (Hybridists follow the deconstruction
(question of subordination) of Asymmetricalists but follow the reconstruction (proposed
remedy) of Symmetricalists. Hybrid prefers rules that find the golden mean and neutralize
insider power while not committing reciprocal subordination.)
114. STONE, supra note 75, at 68 (noting under a scheme like Asymmetrical’s the
“potential collateral effects of litigation,” like res judicata could be maladaptive to progress.);
see STONE, supra note 75.
115. See Parker-Flynn, supra note 100; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1302–06 (2007) (Regarding strict scrutiny as effectively
a categorical bar, noting despite “Gerald Gunther’s much-quoted remark that strict scrutiny is
‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact,’ the Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that strict
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standard of intermediate scrutiny is more reasonable and does not unduly
prejudice against insiders.116
The Hybridist would likely echo the Symmetricalist’s analysis of
guardianship holding under the critical epistemologies and will not repeat
them here. Only note that a Hybridist would support this measure because
it attempts to find a mean between the human-insider and non-humanoutsider. Similarly, the Hybridist would concur the Asymmetricalist’s
analyses of the broadening of applicable statutes and will not rehash that
analysis. What follows is only an application of critical epistemologies to
the third Hybridist holding, the mitigating of strict scrutiny to intermediate
scrutiny.
The intermediate scrutiny holding passes rational and empirical epistemology.
The default ruling of the EPA will still be in favor of a new environmentalfriendly regulation and a substantial interest must otherwise overrule the
regulation and its benefits. Relative to the Asymmetricalist’s compelling
interest standard, and although disfavored, the hybridist intermediate standard
still provides a reasonable means of protecting the environment without
overburdening the insider interests. This, in the Hybridist’ view, allows for
societal, industrial, and technological advancement while still providing
adequate redress to the environment.
This holding over intermediate scrutiny would not pass under standpoint
or postmodern epistemologies. Arguably, if the climate could speak, it
would desire most to regulate itself altogether without interference from
its most-sentient species. As such, under any rule where humans have the
final say over the impact to the whole planet, the best interests of the environment
are furthered by the most minimal interaction possible.117 We are forever
beyond that remedy. Many Hybridists would remain not confident that a
proper balance can be struck as a matter of law that will truly vindicate

scrutiny will permit infringements of preferred rights only to avert rare, catastrophic
harms.”).
116. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny only requires a
substantial government interest and the law must be “not more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest.”) (quoting id. at 566 (majority opinion)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
117. Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotzé, Living in Harmony with
Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, 7:3 TRANSNAT’L
ENV’T L., 397, 398 (2018) (“In the anthropocentric ethic, humans consider themselves the
dominant and most important life form; non-human lives are important only insofar as
they are useful for maintaining the position of humans at the top of the social hierarchy.”).
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the norms of the environment. But, in any event, neutralizing the power
of the industrial establishment is a suitable compromise.
Positionality is validated by the third part of the holding, however. In
the balancing of hypertruths, the hybridist holding validates the immediate
need to protect the environment while not completely disavowing the
interests of humanity. But in the end, this holding still upholds the great
overarching value in our jurisprudence in this case: the promotion of one
earth, one planet, and one world.118
C. Commentary
The current political climate (pun intended) in 2020 is littered with
discussions of green energy and the need to curb the causes and effects of
climate change. This Comment was first written to explore the juridical
methods and judicial techniques of traditionalist and criticalist philosophies
as applied to environmental law and the Court’s perspective on the issue
of global warming in Massachusetts.
The majority’s opinion, written by Justice Stevens, holds for the first
time that a State has standing to petition the EPA for a regulation that
could remedy an injury to that sovereign’s shores. Some view this reach
of judicial power as the Court injecting itself into the political arena. Justice
Stevens furthermore holds the EPA responsible for fulfilling its congressional
mandate by forcing regulation of greenhouse gases. Those who accuse the
Court of activism would say this is a “political question”119 left to the other
two branches of government.
The traditionalists confine their rulings to existing structures of law.
Justice Positivism sides with Chief Justice Roberts and refuses to recognize
the claim against the EPA for lack of standing by Massachusetts, relying
on the precedent and existing rules regarding constitutional standing
118. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 122–30; see also id. at 128 (“Accepting the
premises of Earth jurisprudence has fundamental implications for the study of jurisprudence,
law and governance. Currently we learn about jurisprudence and law in law libraries and
lecture theaters from which nature is meticulously excluded. From an Earth-centered
perspective, this means that we are devising our legal philosophies and laws without
reference to the ‘primary texts’ (i.e., nature) and seeking answers in libraries that do not
contain those answers.”).
119. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).

116

WRIGHT_12 (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 12: 91, 2021]

5/27/2021 9:40 AM

Judicial Perspectives
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

requirements. Justice Pragmatism finds no qualms with assenting to the
majority’s finding of standing as a policy-discovery measure but refuses
to violate the separation of powers doctrine by mandating how an executive
agency chooses to regulate. Justice Nominalism applies his own standard
of wisdom and calls this an easy case based on his own gut-feelings on
the necessity of combatting climate change.
The Criticalist justices break the structure and restrictions of conventional
statutory and precedent-bound methods of interpretation.120 Justice Symmetrical
adopts Professor Stone’s concept of guardianship as an acceptable means
of providing equal standing. Justice Asymmetrical prefers granting standing
to any entity capable of providing guardianship, expands the scope of
applicable statutes, and counterbalances the scales by creating an exacting
standard for insiders to overcome should they desire to challenge a new
regulation. Justice Hybrid splits the difference, favoring Asymmetrical’s
deconstruction and Symmetrical’s reconstruction by neutralizing insider
power with an intermediate scrutiny standard for insiders, while preventing
vexatious litigation via appointed guardianship.
It seems, therefore, that Justice Hybrid best supports diversity and
inclusion.121 While Asymmetrical validates outsider norms the most, the
remedy is too extreme and arguably unworkable for a modern society.
The only standard beyond strict scrutiny is an absolute standard. Hybrid,
on the other hand, provides a means of redress that covers all intersectionalities
of outsiders, provides for equal access to the process, and still succeeds to
include a way that the human-insider can effectuate economic and industrial
progress.
Throughout the development of critical theory, on numerous occasions
the criticalist perspectives eventually became governing law.122 Although

120. See BROOKS, supra note 66, at 211–25, 308 (explaining central to Critical Theory is
the tenant of anti-objectivism. Anti-objectivism, as a basic assumption, presumes that the
existing legal framework, created by privileged insiders, is inherently biased, either
consciously or unconsciously. Criticalists rely on anti-objectivism as the foundation for
reasoning that seeks to validate outsider norms and perspectives in an imperfect and
historically subordinating structure of existing law. Without subordination, there is no
critical process to undergo.).
121. See GINSBURG, supra note 94, at 268–76 (discussing the “value of diversity”.).
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (dawn of the Civil
Rights Era); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (promoting associated statutes that were
enacted in the years following Brown); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(allowing equal educational opportunities for women); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(vindicating feminist norms and women’s right to elect pregnancy termination).
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primarily enacted through statutes after landmark cases, this trend demonstrates
society’s progressive desire to recognize shifting values and norms towards
outsider perspectives. The present case is no different.
Professor Stone’s seminal work cited passim was published in 1972.
Professor Nash and Fr. Berry published works on the Rights of Earth in
1989 and 2001, respectively. Cullinan’s Wild Law cited passim was published
in 2003. In the mid-2000s, the Community Environmental Legal Defense
Fund assisted in drafting the Rights of Nature approved by a town council,
the first instance of recognized Rights of Nature in law. In September
2008, the people of Ecuador voted in a referendum to amend the Constitution
of Ecuador, creating the first constitution recognizing the rights of Mother
Earth.123 In April of 2010, the Bolivian people proclaimed a Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and codified it into law in
2012.124
In 2011, the first lawsuit over the Rights of Nature was adjudicated in
Ecuador. The named plaintiff was a river that defended itself from a project
that would affect its health. In 2014, New Zealand’s Parliament recognized
that a former park of 2000 square kilometers had “legal recognition in its
own right.”125 In 2017, Columbia recognized similar rights in a river. In
2017, Mexico City amended its constitution and the city of Lafayette, CO,
enacted the first Climate Bill of Rights, both codifying the legal rights of
nature.126 On October 17, 2019, The Democratic Party of Florida adopted
the Rights of Nature into its party platform.127

123. See República del Ecuador Constitucion de 2008 January 31, 2011, tit. II, ch. 7,
art. 71–74; Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 398–99.
124. Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 397, 399–404, 406–07. Id. at 400
(“[W]hile there seems to be no easy answer to such profound contradictions and
complexities that overshadow the idealistic promise and potential of juridically innovative
ways to safeguard Earth system integrity, the rights of nature debate and its practical
manifestation in legal systems such as that of Bolivia provide considerable opportunities
to begin with a much needed re-imagination of law and its ability to protect nature.”). See
John Vidal, Bolivia Enshrines Natural World’s Rights with Equal Status for Mother Earth,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/10/
bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights [https://perma.cc/KS59-LYWF]; Timeline of Articles
on the Rights of Nature, GLOB. ALL. FOR RIGHTS OF NATURE, https://therightsofnature.org/
timeline/ [https://perma.cc/H5LA-FT7Q]; CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 183–91.
125. Calzadilla & Kotzé, supra note 117, at 398–99 nn.11, 12; Whanganui River Deed
of Settlement Between the Crown and Whanganui Iwi, https://www.govt.nz/assets/
Documents/OTS/Whanganui-Iwi/Whanganui-Iwi-Whanganui-River-Deed-of-SettlementSummary-5-Aug-014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6FN-QXNM] (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
126. See Timeline of Articles on the Rights of Nature, GLOB. ALL. FOR RIGHTS OF
NATURE, https://therightsofnature.org/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/H5LA-FT7Q].
127. MEDIA STATEMENT: FLORIDA DEMOCRATS ADOPT RIGHTS OF NATURE IN PARTY
PLATFORM (OCT. 15, 2019), https://celdf.org/2019/10/media-statement-florida-democratsadopt-rights-of-nature-in-party-platform/ [https://perma.cc/6T6T-2LBY].
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We are all inhabitants of our Mother Earth. We are all included as
beneficiaries in the solution to global warming. Every race, creed, and
nationality benefits from the sustainment of our planet and preservation
of biodiversity and global temperature.128 Under any of the Criticalist holdings,
minority groups, the underprivileged, underrepresented minorities which
have been subordinated by the corporate-elite backed legal system have a
mode of redress on behalf of their planet. Industries and corporations driving
for profits who manipulate the system can no longer avoid the piercing cries
of the indigent and the young, nor the Earth that they have ravaged for its
resources. Every intersectionality of life on Earth, human, animal, plant,
ecosystem, and climate included, is given a voice.
In all reality, I think courts would be reluctant to further this line of
judicial decision-making. The justification of the process here, the means
to the end, opens the proverbial door to an unbounded, unrestricted potential
for future “cases and controversies” not previously sustainable. Broadening
the definition of standing to the degree the Criticalist’s advocate may
create an impetus to recognize other collective, amorphous associations
that cannot satisfy the traditional requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability. The result may include far-reaching implications and expansive
judicial power to adjudicate more than a case or controversy. Let us consider
the possible extremes of such a holding.129
If the environment is considered an outsider and a compilation of
inanimate objects is now given the legal effect of standing, why then should we
not give voices to groups whose injuries in more conventional claims are
just as attenuated and imprecise? For instance, the millennial generation
has mounting student loan debt. The current, collective college loan debt

128. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties for 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L5JZ-4J2X]; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties for 2013, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LJ7D-QJVB].
129. See Calzadilla and Kotzé, supra note 117, at 424 (stating “The key challenge in
this respect would be to reconcile as far as possible such radical worldviews with the prevailing,
more conventional Western, often Eurocentric and predominantly anthropocentric, visions
of law that form the basis of most legal systems the world over. We would need to open
ourselves as lawyers, politicians and academics, among many other role players, to these
alternative, potentially progressive, and possibly more effective juridical framings that
focus on preserving Earth system integrity.”).
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tops $1.5 trillion spread over some 40 million Americans.130 In most cases,
predatory lending led to the legalized leveraging of college debt on the
generationally-backed value that college education is a right and everyone
should secure a loan for financing. But now the value of the individual degree
has decreased due to the increase in supply. College graduates are having
a harder time finding jobs that will pay commensurate with their education.
Many millennials have tight cash flow, will work well into retirement years
to pay back loans, and may scrap together just enough savings to live on.
There has been a call for a debt jubilee.
If a court were so activist as to recognize a new judicial power to protect
the environment, it may be equally as likely to invalidate loan contracts
(even on a more traditional contract excuse such as unconscionability) and
void all student debts for an entire generation of student-outsiders who
were subordinated by the laws that protect lenders and universities. While
some would hail such a decision, the second and third order effects are
too immense to measure. The lost capital in the banking industry would
undoubtedly cripple some financial institutions. That debt is still an asset
on the balance sheets of banks, on which investors rely for the preservation
of capital. In order to mitigate future risks, banks would force disclosure
from all future loan applicants as to the status of the applicant’s prior student
loans. Interest rates would increase due to the need to hedge against more
risky loans in the future and to make up for losses, and so on. A ruling
such as this would be possible under a Criticalist theory looking to vindicate
millennial generational norms, where “collective standing” could be justified
on the same grounds that gave the environment standing, because “particularized,
imminent injuries” fall under a now broadened scope of interpretation.
Another, arguably larger example is the insolvency of Social Security.
Under the process condoned by the Criticalists, an activist court could
effectively invalidate social security. Congress has already had to raise the
retirement age. What is stopping a court from simply striking down social
security mandatory payments in order to reprieve the nation’s balance
sheet? Social security and other entitlements make up 52% of the national
budget and the total unfunded debt liabilities by governments in the
United States is $25 trillion.131 Without infringing on the debt or interest
owed foreign powers or bond holders, the Court could simply provide for
a nullification of social security obligations. The elderly will no longer be

130. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Research and Statistics Group, Q2 Q. REP. ON
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2019q2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSY5-6R7Z].
131. CHRISTOPHER CHANTRILL, U.S. GOVERNMENT SPENDING (Oct. 10, 2020), https://
www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal deficit [https://perma.cc/B6QQ-P69U].
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paid, but the young will have greater cash flow and half the US national
debt will evaporate.
In the evolving financial nature of the country, a Court could consider
the young and unborn future generations as outsiders, unfairly born and
raised into a pay-as-you-go system of debt that they never consented to.
If an entity as amorphous as the climate can articulate standing, why not
the collective unborn, future generations? If the Court finds standing in such
an instance and finds it simply untenable and unconscionable to allow the
past generations to burden the future generations with shouldered debt, the
Court could, in theory, wipe it out. Such a finding, possible with broadened
applications of constitutional standing, are within the scope of Criticalist
corrective remedies.
In the case of Massachusetts, the second and third order effects of overregulating industrial and economic sectors could have drastic implications
for the human standard of living. Transitioning off fossil fuels for power
and transportation before we have sustainable alternative sources of energy
will undoubtedly have adverse and nation-threatening effects on commerce
and society’s stability. Whether considering the loan forgiveness, judicially
mandated entitlement reform, or judicial fiat on greenhouse gas emissions,
the Court would effectively assert all the authority reserved to the Legislature
and Executive. Even under Justice Symmetrical’s moderate holding requiring
a guardian, judicial review would become a process for unprecedented
policy-making beyond the scope of the judicial function.132 Disregard of
constitutional and statutory limitations in a radical attempt to effect change
through unbridled re-interpretation is a dangerous and powerful precedent,
and many believe this type of reasoning can only lead to judicial usurpation
and tyranny.133
132. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of
its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses
the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands
the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments.”).
133.
Id. (“[The judiciary] can never attack with success either of the other two
[branches] . . . though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of
justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered . . . so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the [L]egislature and the Executive. . . . ‘[T]here is no
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Having considered the extremes and by re-orienting the problem in the
frame of judicial construction, prudence dictates the People remain sovereign
through the democratic process and put the pressure on their elected
legislature to act in accordance with their will. A Climate Protection Act or
Climate Change Prevention Act is not beyond the scope of the legislature to
enact. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, Congress has the authority to
statutorily provide a cause of action against an agency to redress injuries.
Where Congress provides a remedy and recognizes an injury, courts
would be more likely to find a case or controversy.134
The key to balancing any issue is moderation, which is what environmentalists
have arguably called for over the past half-century. But they also (validly)
point out that the longer we wait to moderate, the harder the moderation
must be to effectuate a meaningful correction. And the question remains,
who decides when and how to balance the scales. There is the possibility
that even despite a Congressional mandate, a stalwart agency or court may
refuse to recognize a cognizable injury to the environment. But, I have great
faith in the moderate pace of change that our system permits.
However, I must concede that there is one great counter-argument to
the two extreme hypothetical examples posed above: the question in the
case sub judice is an existential one, beyond the concept of property, the
reach of statutes, and the structure of the Constitution. We are talking about
survival. The seemingly inescapable gravity that threatens the continued
existence of our society and species compels action. Humanity cannot
wait; without the human race there is no need for human law. Perhaps, as
the scholars cited passim suggest, the time has come to abandon traditional
doctrines like constitutional standing. Perhaps, we should rethink the very
structure of our jurisprudence.135 The case below illustrates.
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ . . .
[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to
fear from its union with either of the other departments[.]”). See also, Antonin Scalia,
“Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 39, 42 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1997); GINSBURG, supra note 94, at 229–30.
134. See Massachusetts v. EPA, Oral Arguments, supra note 46, at 40:14-41:5
(Respondent responding to Chief Justice Roberts’s question regarding whether a statute
conferring a cause of action can necessarily vitiate standing saying: “Congress could make
findings with respect to causation or other issues that this Court would have to give
deference to and seriously consider, but [the Chief Justice is] right. It would not override
the requirements of Article III.”).
135. See CULLINAN, supra note 84, at 170 (“If we are to halt and reverse the process
of degrading Earth we must completely revise how we govern ourselves. . . . [W]e must
reject the misperception that humans are separate from Earth.”); see also id. at 177 (“‘[T]he
environment’ cannot be adequately dealt with simply by creating a new category of
environmental law. Ultimately, all law must be based upon and reflect Earth jurisprudence,
as must all institutional structures of our societies.”).
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III. JULIANA V. UNITED STATES136
In 2018, several plaintiffs, many of them teenagers and young adults
concerned about climate change, filed a lawsuit in federal court against
the United States government.137 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
from to compel the federal government to curb CO2 emissions.138 The
district court concluded, “the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable
questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due
process right to a ‘climate system capable of sustaining human life.’”139
Despite a voluminous record,140 the Ninth Circuit reversed, 2 to 1.141
Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Hurwitz conceded the first two
prongs of standing, causation and injury, but ruled the plaintiffs failed to
allege redressability: they failed to show how a favorable judicial ruling
136. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2020).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1166 (“The operative complaint accuses the government of continuing to
“permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel use despite long being aware of its risks, thereby
causing various climate-change related injuries to the plaintiffs. Some plaintiffs claim
psychological harm, others impairment to recreational interests, others exacerbated medical
conditions, and others damage to property. The complaint asserts violations of: (1) the
plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
(2) the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to equal protection of the law; (3) the
plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine. The plaintiffs
seek declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan to
“phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric [carbon dioxide].”
(alteration original)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1166 (“The plaintiffs have compiled an extensive record . . . [that] leaves
little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace. . . .
[S]ince the dawn of the Industrial Age, atmospheric carbon dioxide has skyrocketed to
levels not seen for almost three million years. . . . Today, it is over 410 parts per million
and climbing. . . . Copious expert evidence establishes that this unprecedented rise stems
from fossil fuel combustion and will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked.
Temperatures . . . may rise more than 6 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. . . . This
extreme heat is melting polar ice caps and may cause sea levels to rise 15 to 30 feet by
2100. The problem is approaching ‘the point of no return. . . .’ [T]he federal government
has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.
As early as 1965, the Johnson Administration cautioned that fossil fuel emissions threatened
significant changes to climate, global temperatures, sea levels, and other stratospheric
properties. In 1983, an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) report projected an
increase of 2 degrees Celsius by 2040, warning that a ‘wait and see’ carbon emissions policy
was extremely risky. . . . Nonetheless, by 2014, U.S. fossil fuel emissions had climbed. . .
from 1965. This growth shows no signs of abating. . . . [T]he country is now expanding
oil and gas extraction four times faster than any other nation.”).
141. Id. at 1175.
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would actually lead to reduced CO2 emissions and beneficial environmental
impact. 142 The majority further stated such an incursion on policydeterminations would violate the separation of powers doctrine, noting the
democratic branches are the appropriate vehicles for policy change.143
However, District Judge Staton, sitting by designation, dissented.144 Judge
Staton’s opinion rejected the confines of standing and instead embraced a
new principle: “Plaintiffs bring suit to enforce the most basic structural
principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty: that the Constitution
does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction.”145 Judge Staton expounds
on this “perpetuity principle.” Although the question here is existential,
she does not limit its reach to solely environmental matters.146 Specifically
142. Id. at 1170 (“The crux of the plaintiffs’ requested remedy is an injunction
requiring the government not only to cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil
fuel use, but also to prepare a plan subject to judicial approval to draw down harmful
emissions. The plaintiffs thus seek not only to enjoin the Executive from exercising
discretionary authority expressly granted by Congress . . . an order simply enjoining those
activities will not, according to their own experts’ opinions, suffice to stop catastrophic
climate change or even ameliorate their injuries. The plaintiffs’ experts opine that the
federal government’s leases and subsidies have contributed to global carbon emissions.
But they do not show that even the total elimination of the challenged programs would halt the
growth of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, let alone decrease that growth. . . .
Rather, the record shows that many of the emissions causing climate change happened
decades ago or come from foreign and non-governmental sources.”).
143. Id. at 1172. “[T]his kind of plan will demand action not only by the Executive,
but also by Congress. Absent court intervention, the political branches might conclude . . .
that economic or defense considerations called for continuation of the very programs challenged
in this suit, or a less robust approach to addressing climate change than the plaintiffs
believe is necessary. ‘But we cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s [or
Legislature’s] predictive judgments on such matters . . .’” (alterations original, citations
omitted).
144. Id. at 1175 (Staton, District Judge, dissenting).
145. Id. at 1175–76 (“[P]laintiffs’ claims adhere to a judicially administrable standard.
And considering plaintiffs seek no less than to forestall the Nation’s demise, even a partial
and temporary reprieve would constitute meaningful redress. Such relief, much like the
desegregation orders and statewide prison injunctions the Supreme Court has sanctioned,
would vindicate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without exceeding the Judiciary’s province.”);
see id. at 1182 (“[P]laintiffs have a constitutional right to be free from irreversible and
catastrophic climate change.”) (comparing due process rights annunciated in Brown v. Board
and Furman v. Georgia).
146. Id. at 1179 (“This perpetuity principle does not amount to “a right to live in a
contaminant-free, healthy environment.” . . . be sure, the stakes can be quite high in
environmental disputes, as pollution causes tens of thousands of premature deaths each
year, not to mention disability and diminished quality of life. Many abhor living in a polluted
environment, and some pay with their lives. But mine-run environmental concerns “involve a
host of policy choices that must be made by . . . elected representatives, rather than by
federal judges interpreting the basic charter of government[.]” . . . The perpetuity principle
is not an environmental right at all, and it does not task the courts with determining the
optimal level of environmental regulation; rather, it prohibits only the willful dissolution
of the Republic.”) (internal citations omitted).
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disagreeing with the majority on the third prong of the standing requirements,
Judge Staton relies on Massachusetts v. EPA to find that the redressability
element is satisfied, as “some” reduction of CO2 is a quantifiable redress.147
But, in deriving a Due Process right for the individual to live in a noncataclysmic climate, Judge Staton neatly side-steps the “special solicitude”
the State of Massachusetts enjoyed, expanding Massachusetts even further
than Justice Stevens had imagined.148 Besides, standing doctrine, like
other justiciability doctrines, is often used solely for courts to decide which
cases they want to hear and which issues they would rather refrain from
addressing. Judge Staton criticized the majority’s rigid adherence to
the separation of powers, calling the doctrine “deference-to-a-fault” when
“yielding” to the political branches will “walk the Nation over a cliff.”149
What Brown was for segregation, this case could have been for climate
change.150
At a minimum, Judge Staton is a far-flung Pragmatist, believing that
“faithful application of our history and precedents reveals that a failure to
[confront and reconcile the tension between separation of powers and
judicial review] leads to the wrong result.”151 But, unless the words of her
opinion cloak a subtext of environmentalism that goes undetected, she is
not employing any critical environmental perspectives. Although her
deconstruction follows that of the Asymmetrical critical theorist, she does
not offer a reconstructive remedy so radical as to embody a true critical
theorist; she does not offer any analysis on the perspective of the environment

147. Id. at 1182 (“[A] non-negligible reduction in emissions—there, by regulating vehicles
emissions—satisfie[s] the redressability requirement of Article III[.]”).
148. Id. at 1183 nn.8, 9; see id. at 1187 (“[W]e need not definitively determine that
standard today. Rather, we need conclude only that plaintiffs have submitted sufficient
evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether such an amount can possibly be
determined as a matter of scientific fact.”)
149. Id. at 1184 (“[T]he doctrine of judicial review compels federal courts to fashion
and effectuate relief to right legal wrongs, even when . . . it requires that we instruct the
other branches as to the constitutional limitations on their power. Indeed, sometimes ‘the
[judicial and governance] roles briefly and partially coincide when a court, in granting
relief against actual harm that has been suffered, . . . orders the alteration of an institutional
organization or procedure that causes the harm.’” (citation omitted)).
150. Id. at 1188–89; see id. at 1191 (“And while all would now readily agree that the
91 years between the Emancipation Proclamation and the decision in Brown v. Board was
too long, determining when a court must step in to protect fundamental rights is not an
exact science.”).
151. See id. at 1184 (illustrating that pragmatists are consequentialists and often
concerned primarily about the results of their decisions.).
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as an outsider. At the extreme, the good Judge may be a Nominalist at heart
in that she is most concerned with the enforcement of her own values and
feelings as to what is “right.”
IV. CONCLUSION
The dissent’s conclusion is rooted in legal realism and is ironically
and particularly unnerving. Judge Staton’s reasoning is more expansive
of judicial power than a critical theorist in that it is not limited solely to
the environmental issue. It lays the groundwork for the hypotheticals I
posed above: if the Court can dream up a Due Process right under the Fifth
Amendment to live in a climate-change-free environment, what new
rights-to-be-created would exceed the newfound scope of judicial power?
Furthermore, if the Court can re-legislate for Congress and compel the
Executive to act in accordance with judicial decree to the extent the Juliana
dissent proposes, there is some merit to the proposition that our democratic
elections would become empty ceremonies. Some may pontificate that the
sole purpose of future elections may be only to impeach unelected judges.
Then again, throughout human history, the times have presented decision
points that demand employment of that exclusive quality of our human race:
Leadership. Perhaps the need to stop climate change is such a moment.
Perhaps leaders are sometimes found in black robes.
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